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Abstract 
We analyse two inter-related features of regional housing markets: 
determinants of new housing supply, and the impact of supply responsiveness on 
price dynamics. We demonstrate that a suitably specified q-theory model 
(including residential land values as well as construction costs) explains intended 
housing starts. Few prior studies have found significant land price effects, due 
either to their omission or (possibly) to incorrect data definition (use of 
agricultural rather than residential land values).  We examine the interaction of 
supply responsiveness and price adjustment following demand shocks, using a 
new panel dataset covering 53 quarters across 73 regions of New Zealand. 
Regions with high supply responsiveness have relatively small price spikes 
following demand shocks, consistent with a rational response that limits house 
price jumps in regions with strong supply responses. 
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Regional house price dynamics in response to demand shocks are of 
central policy importance. Resources may be misallocated where short run prices 
diverge from equilibrium; prospective purchasers (sellers) suffer where prices are 
higher (lower) than equilibrium. Social policy concerns relating to housing 
affordability are magnified where prices jump well above long run equilibria.  
Given these concerns, we analyse two inter-related features of regional 
housing markets: new housing supply determinants and the dynamics of price 
adjustment. We treat housing supply as fixed in the very short run, so demand 
shocks are reflected initially only in house prices rather than in quantities.
1 New 
house supply reacts to house prices and to costs of developing new houses. 
Rational agents anticipate these supply responses in their pricing decisions 
following a demand shock; thus the dynamics of price adjustment are related to 
anticipated local house supply responsiveness. 
We explicitly model the determinants of new housing supply. Despite 
its theoretical and intuitive attractiveness, previous studies have struggled to apply 
a Tobin's "q" approach to explaining investment in housing.
2 We demonstrate that, 
with a suitably specified model, a q-theory specification does satisfactorily 
explain intended housing starts. We apply the theory using a new panel dataset 
covering 53 quarters across all 73 regions of mainland New Zealand (3,869 
observations). Subsequently, we examine the impact that supply responsiveness 
has on price dynamics. Several recent international studies have examined the 
impact of regulation on prices. Our study supplements these analyses by explicitly 
examining the interaction of supply responsiveness with the speed and degree of 
price adjustment following demand shocks. 
                                                             
1 Thus housing supply can be treated as exogenous in the house price equation. 
2 Harter-Dreiman (2003), for instance, notes that a broad consensus about the supply elasticity of 
housing does not exist. 2 
Our results demonstrate, first, that application of q-theory to housing 
supply should include not only the house price and construction costs (which are 
standard in most prior specifications) but also the cost of land. We find strong, 
statistically significant, impacts of each relevant variable - including land prices - 
on new housing supply. We estimate the hypothesised relationship initially with 
coefficients restricted across regions and subsequently without cross-region 
restrictions. The cross-region restrictions are not accepted, implying that supply 
elasticities are region-specific, even after accounting for region-specific land 
prices. This finding is consistent with the existence of regulatory differences 
across local authorities. Second, our results demonstrate that regions with 
relatively high supply responsiveness have relatively small price spikes following 
demand shocks. This is consistent with a rational response that limits the jump in 
house prices in regions that have strong supply responses. In areas with weak 
supply response, prices jump further since new supply is not forthcoming in the 
near term to meet the higher demand. 
To illustrate the supply results, Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the 
relationship between new housing consents (expressed as a percentage of the 
existing housing stock) versus the logarithm of house prices relative to 
development costs.
3  The scatter plot covers all 3,869 observations using de-
meaned data for each region. A clear positive supply relationship can be 
discerned. The relationship between supply responsiveness and the degree of price 
adjustment following a demand shock is summarised in a scatter plot for the 
relevant 73 regional supply and price adjustment parameters in Figure 3. The 
relationships underlying this plot are discussed further in the paper and are 
analysed in Table 3; for now, the posited negative relationship between the two 
can be seen. 
Section 2 of the paper outlines our application of q-theory to housing 
investment and relates previous housing supply estimates to this framework. We 
present our estimation results together with robustness checks on the results. 
Section 3 outlines our model for house price dynamics and sets out our hypothesis 
                                                             
3 Development costs are calculated as a logarithmically weighted average of construction costs 
(2/3) and land costs (1/3) in line with estimates subsequently in the paper.  3 
linking supply responsiveness to price dynamics. We estimate the specified 
equations and conduct tests of the relationship between supply responsiveness and 
price dynamics. Section 4 has concluding remarks with pointers to future work. 
An appendix describes the data used in the study. 4 
2  House Supply Determinants 
 
We treat housing developers as profit-seeking agents. A developer 
seeks to build a new house where the expected house sale price exceeds the full 
costs of developing and building the house. We assume that a house built in 
period t is destined for sale in t+1. The expected sale price in t+1, given 
information at time t, is denoted PH
e
t+1. The developer's total costs (TCt) comprise 
land costs borne in period t (PLt), building costs (materials and labour) in period t 
(PBt) and financing costs (determined by rt, where rt is the nominal interest rate, 
adjusted for a risk premium, between t and t+1).  
We model the planned rate of change in housing supply between t and 
t+1 as being equal to the rate of new housing consents granted in period t (HCt) 
relative to the existing housing stock (Ht-1).
4 We use housing consents as a 
measure of planned changes since a new house can be constructed legally only 
following the granting of a consent by the relevant territorial local authority 
(TLA), which is the unit of analysis in the study. Expressing the relationship in 
log-linear form, and allowing the coefficients (γi0, γi1) to be potentially region-
specific,
5 we hypothesise that new housing supply for each region i is given by 
equation (1) (in which εit is an iid error term): 
 
HCit/Hit-1 = γi0 + γi1ln{PH
e
it+1/TCit} + εit   (1) 
 
We model expected house prices, PH
e
it+1, as a function of existing 
house prices in region i at period t, together with a region-specific growth factor 
                                                             
4 We use Ht-1 rather than Ht in the denominator since the former is known at time t. Since H is a 
stock variable, it makes virtually no difference which of the two we use. Also note that HCt/Ht-1 ≅ 
∆lnHt provided all consents in period t are converted into new houses in period t and provided 
there is no scrapping of existing houses. In practice, there is some scrapping and some consents are 
not actioned; these effects are minor and can be catered for in the time and region fixed effects in 
the estimated equations (where the effects are consistent over time and/or over regions) as well as 
in the error term (where the effects are random). 
5 Subsequently, we treat the term γi0 as a nationwide constant, γ0, plus a vector of area fixed 
effects. 5 
(proxied by a vector of region-fixed effects, FEi, with associated coefficient 
vector, λi) and a nationwide time-specific growth factor (proxied by time fixed 




it+1) = ln(PHit) + λiFEi + λtFEt      (2) 
  
Total costs are modelled as a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function of 
land and building costs; both land and building costs are relevant to the developer 
in deciding whether to purchase a plot of land plus construction materials and 
labour for a specific housing development. In addition, we include financial costs, 
reflecting the costs of borrowing to cover construction materials, labour and land 





1-βi](1+rt)    (3)      
 
Combining equations (1) to (3) we obtain the q-theory equation, (4), for housing 
supply: 
 
HCit/Hit-1 = λ'0 + γi1ln{PHit/PBit} + µiln{PBit/PLit} + λ'iFEi + λ'tFEt  + εit (4) 
 
where µi=γi1βi, the λ't incorporate the impact of rt plus any time-specific risk 
premia plus other time fixed effects, the λ'i incorporate all region-specific fixed 
effects from equations (1) to (3), and λ'0 is the overall constant term excluding 
time and area fixed effects.  
DiPasquale (1999) notes that in comparison with the large literature on 
housing demand, housing supply has been studied far less, and often with 
inconclusive results. Poterba (1984) and Topel and Rosen (1988) both take q-
theory-related approaches to modelling housing supply. Poterba models net 
investment in housing structures as a function of real house prices, the price of 
non-residential construction, construction costs (real wages) and a measure for 6 
credit availability. The price of housing is the main determinant of new 
construction with estimated elasticities of new construction with respect to real 
house prices ranging from 0.5 to 2.3.  Topel and Rosen estimate a supply function 
where housing starts are a function of real house prices and vector of cost shifters. 
They estimate a long-run supply elasticity of 3.0 and a short-run elasticity of 
about 1.0. Similar to Poterba, none of their cost measures is significant. Neither 
Topel and Rosen nor Poterba explicitly address the role of land, which is one of 
the most unique aspects of housing as an investment.
6 
  More recent studies have sought to incorporate land as an input. 
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) estimate a model of housing construction that 
combines a stock adjustment process with a long run spatially-based definition of 
the equilibrium housing stock. Housing starts are a function of current housing 
prices, real interest rates, land costs (price of surrounding farmland), construction 
costs (material and labour) and the stock of housing in the previous period. Both 
their cost index and land price are statistically insignificant. We note here that the 
DiPasquale and Wheaton measure of land prices (farmland prices) differs from 
ours (residential values). In the presence of zoning restrictions that prevent 
residential subdivision of farmland,
7 the latter is likely to be the more relevant 
land measure; this may explain DiPasquale and Wheaton's finding that land prices 
have no significant effect on housing starts.  
Recent work by Mayer and Somerville (1996, 2000a, 2000b) uses 
models of residential construction based on the theory of urban land development 
presented in Capozza and Helsey (1989). Mayer and Somerville construct a model 
where housing starts are a function of price and cost changes rather than levels, 
arguing that because housing starts are a flow variable, starts should be a function 
of other flow variables (i.e. price changes rather than levels). They contend that a 
model where starts are a function of the price level would predict a permanent 
increase in the number of housing starts resulting from a one-time increase in 
population or house prices. We consider, however, that this argument is incorrect. 
                                                             
6 Poterba acknowledges the importance of land but omits it in his empirical work due to a lack of 
data. For related approaches, refer to Follain (1979) and Blackley (1999); see also Meen (2000) 
and Tsoukis and Westaway (1994). 
7 The importance of regulation in affecting prices and supply is discussed further in section 3. 7 
The q-theory of investment, as derived here, links new investment to the levels of 
output and input prices. Both prices and quantities adjust to restore equilibrium 
following a shock, without the explosive increase in new investment posited by 
Mayer and Somerville. We therefore retain our explicitly derived housing supply 
equation, (4), as our modeling basis. 
We estimate (4) using four separate approaches. Initially, we estimate 
the equation by pooled (ordinary) least squares (PLS), firstly with coefficients 
restricted to be identical across regions (other than the regional fixed effects) and 
secondly with unrestricted coefficients. We test the validity of the restrictions 
across regions. Subsequently, we estimate the equation using instrumental 
variables (IV). We do so because of the potential simultaneity between building 
consents in period t and the price and cost terms in period t. We estimate the IV 
equations in both restricted and unrestricted forms. The instruments comprise the 
set of variables appearing in the house price equation reported in section 3.
8 In all 
cases, we report standard errors using White period standard errors that are robust 
to arbitrary within cross-section residual autocorrelation. Results are reported in 
Table 1; all equations include both region and time fixed effects. 
The key parameter determining responsiveness of new housing supply 
to demand shocks (which are reflected in house prices) is γi1. In the restricted PLS 
equation, γi1 is significant at the 1% level [p=0.0000]. The size of γi1 indicates that 
building consents rise by approximately 0.5% in response to a 1% increase in 
house prices (relative to building costs). The restricted IV equation indicates 
higher responsiveness; with building consents rising by approximately 1.1% in 
response to a 1% increase in house prices (relative to building costs). The 
difference between the two estimates suggests that prices and/or costs are 
themselves influenced by the supply response, consistent with our theoretical 
priors. We therefore treat the IV results as our preferred estimates. 
                                                             
8 Specifically, after substituting the variables from the long run house price equation, (7), into the 
price adjustment equation, (9), the set of instruments is: lnXPRODit-1, lnXEMPit-1, lnDDit-1, UCit-1, 
Sit-2. We include the full set of instruments to ensure theoretical consistency across the supply and 
price equations. We have also estimated the supply equation using four lags of each of the 
instruments to test robustness in case of serial correlation in the instruments. The IV estimates are 
virtually unchanged, as is the explanatory power of the equation. We therefore report only the 
results with the instrument set derived explicitly from (7) and (9).         8 
The two restricted estimates find that land prices comprise less than 
half, but still a material portion, of total development costs; the implied βi (=µi/γi1) 
is estimated at 35% in the case of the IV estimate. In each case, the estimate of µi 
is significant at the 1% level; thus omission of land costs (as in a number of prior 
studies) will lead to omitted variables bias. 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 present the unrestricted PLS and IV 
estimates respectively. We do not present all 146 γi1 and µi coefficients, but 
instead report their means (together with the mean of the implied βi). An F-test for 
joint significance of each of γi1 and µi is significant at the 1% level in each case. 
Thus when the specification is estimated at a disaggregated regional level, we still 
find that the q-theory specification holds and that land remains an important 
element of development costs. 
More importantly for the purposes of this paper, a Wald test for the null 
hypothesis of equality of γi1 ∀i is decisively rejected [p = 0.0000]. This finding 
means that supply responsiveness differs across TLA regions. Without further 
information, we cannot determine whether the supply elasticities differ because of 
regulatory factors or because of geographical factors (e.g. mountainous land) or 
because of yet other factors.  
We gain some insights into this issue by comparing the supply 
responsiveness of TLAs within New Zealand's major city, Auckland. The city 
comprises five 'core' TLAs
9 plus a further two TLAs that are semi-rural. We 
concentrate on the five core TLAs so as to compare 'like with like' as much as 
possible. McShane (1996) prepared an assessment of the impact of regulation on 
the 'housing and construction' components of the Consumers Price Index, using 
Auckland case studies. His interpretation of the local authorities' district plans 
rated Papakura local authority as the most development-friendly authority within 
the city.
10 He also found that Papakura had experienced lower increases in 
regulatory costs than experienced by the three other local authorities included in 
his study (North Shore, Waitakere, Auckland City). These insights into relative 
                                                             
9 North Shore, Waitakere, Auckland City, Manukau City, Papakura. 
10 "The Papakura District Plan stands out on account of its relatively friendly attitude towards its 
people and the market-place" (McShane, 1996, p.5). 
   9 
local authority housing supply responsiveness can be compared with our 
econometrically estimated findings regarding supply responsiveness.   
We test the null hypothesis that γi1 is equal for the five core TLAs. A 
Wald test for the null hypothesis of equality is rejected [p=0.0000]. This rejection 
is consistent with McShane's documentation of differences across local 
authorities. Further, these results are obtained after controlling for land prices, 
reflecting geographical constraints and potentially also other regulatory factors 
(e.g. zoning restrictions). To the extent that regulatory factors are responsible for 
the estimated supply responses, these factors must therefore be influencing the 
rate of construction of new dwellings rather than acting through land constraints. 
We present the γi1 (instrumental variables) estimates in Table 2 for the 
five core TLAs. Consistent with McShane's observations, Papakura has the 
highest supply responsiveness, albeit closely followed by Manukau (the latter was 
not covered in McShane's comparison). The supply responsiveness in these two 
TLAs is 50% higher than in Auckland City and is more than twice the 
responsiveness estimated in North Shore and Waitakere. The second column of 
Table 2 reports the estimated region fixed effect for each TLA, which may also 
reflect underlying regulatory differences. Consistent with the supply response 
parameters (and with McShane's documentation), Papakura has the highest 
regional fixed effect of the five core TLAs. Our estimates are therefore consistent 
with prior case study findings.  10 
3  Dynamic House Price Responses 
 
House prices are a 'jump' variable, equating short run housing demand 
with (fixed) short run supply. Quantities and prices of houses adjust over time to 
establish spatial equilibrium whereby the benefits and costs of living in an area are 
equated (Roback, 1982). Accordingly, long run trends in house prices can be 
explained as a function of economic and demographic factors. Pain and Westaway 
(1996) demonstrate that a standard consumer optimisation problem over current 
and future housing and non-housing consumption goods yields the inverted 










t is the price of housing; p
c
t is the price of non-housing 
consumption goods; δ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (within a 
representative constant relative risk aversion utility function); θ is the (constant) 
ratio of housing services to the housing stock, ht; popt is population; cxt is per 
capita non-housing consumption; and uct is the real user cost of capital.  
Empirical application of this approach takes the stock of houses, h, as 
contemporaneously fixed (so can be treated as exogenous in the price equation). 
Prices adjust after a demand shock towards the equilibrium value determined by 
the observed stock of houses; however, the nature of price adjustment may differ 
depending on the nature of the short term supply response.
11 
The importance of housing supply responsiveness for price dynamics 
following a demand shock can be seen from the simple demand and supply graph 
in Figure 2. House prices and quantities (P and Q respectively) are depicted on the 
axes; the line marked D is the demand curve for houses; the line marked S
L is the 
                                                             
11 See Grimes and Aitken (2004) for application of this approach to New Zealand; and Capozza et 
al (2002) for a related approach in the United States. 11 
long run supply curve for houses. Equilibrium is initially at prices and quantities 
(P0, Q0). Housing demand then shifts permanently upwards (to the line marked 
D'), possibly due to a permanent positive employment increase for a given 
population within the region. In (5), this will be reflected through an increase in 
cx. In the long run, the price and quantity of housing settles at (PL, QL). 
In the short run, house supply does not respond fully. Consider the 
perfectly inelastic short run supply curve, S
S. Prices, in the short term, will jump 
to the short run equilibrium at P1. Price P1 can be derived directly from (5) using 
the new value for cx, holding all other variables constant, including h (since 
supply is assumed perfectly inelastic).   
Now consider a case with more responsive short run housing supply, 
given by short run supply curve, S'
S. The new short run equilibrium price will be 
at P2. Denote P1-P0  as ∆P1 and P2-P0  as ∆P2 . From Figure 2, we see that ∆P2  = 
φ∆P1, where 0<φ<1, and where ∂φ/∂γi1<0 (recalling that γi1 is the short run 
elasticity of housing supply). If we were to calculate the new equilibrium price, 
P*, as P1 (i.e. the short run equilibrium price derived on the assumption of a zero 
short run supply elasticity) and estimate the short run adjustment equation, (6),
12 
we would expect the adjustment coefficient, φ, will be close to 1 (respectively 0) 
where short run supply is inelastic (elastic): 
 
∆P = φ(P*t-1 - Pt-1 )    (6) 
 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) emphasise the importance of house supply 
in determining house prices and mediating urban dynamics.
13 When supply 
expands quickly in response to demand pressures the housing stock and 
population can grow quickly with little pressure on house prices. Recent evidence 
                                                             
12 "i" subscripts are added when the equation is estimated at the regional level. This specification 
assumes that short run adjustment responds to demand shocks in the previous quarter; other 
adjustment dynamics can be catered for through slightly different dynamic specifications. 
13 They note also that the durable nature of housing creates an asymmetry in growth; in declining 
areas, house prices are likely to fall before houses are demolished. We do not explore this aspect 
explicitly in the current paper, in part, because the 1991-2004 period has generally been one of 
expansion across much of New Zealand. 12 
indicates that regulation plays an important role in affecting the elasticity of new 
housing supply; see, for example: Mayer and Somerville (2000a), Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2002, 2003), Glaeser et al (2005a, 2005b, 2005c), Green et al (2005) 
and Quigley and Raphael (2005). Glaeser et al (2005b) point out that new 
construction has fallen and housing prices have risen dramatically in a small, but 
increasing number of places. They argue that this is primarily due to increasing 
regulatory barriers to large-scale residential development. Green el al (2005) 
estimate supply elasticities for 44 U.S. metropolitan areas following a model 
based on Capozza and Helsey (1989). Using survey data on land regulation they 
estimate supply elasticities and find that areas that are heavily regulated exhibit 
lower elasticities. 
Building on these insights, we seek to determine whether local 
authorities that have relatively high short run supply responsiveness have less 
volatile price dynamics following demand shocks. In contrast to most of the cited 
studies, we have data that enable us both to estimate supply elasticities explicitly, 
and to estimate the dynamics of price adjustment.  We have already estimated 
supply responsiveness (γi1) in section 2. In order to estimate price dynamics, we 
estimate a standard cointegrating regression for house prices (to determine Pi*), 
and then estimate a log change version of (6) to estimate φi. Our hypothesis is that 
areas with high values of γi1 will have low values of φi; thus the relationship 
between γi1 and φi will be significantly negative. 
We base our specification of P* on the prior work of Grimes and Aitken 
(2004). That work established that the variables of interest are non-stationary and 
a cointegration approach to modelling prices is appropriate. The log of real house 
prices is regressed against log of dwelling density (lnDD; i.e. ln(ht/popt) in (5)), 
the real user cost of capital (UC; i.e. uct in (5)),
14 plus two variables proxying 
determinants of per capita non-housing consumption, cxt in (5), being: lnXPROD 
(the log of per capita regional production) and lnXEMP (the log of employment as 
a ratio of population of working age). We restrict the long run coefficients on 
                                                             
14 We enter uc, multiplied by a freely estimated coefficient, rather than log(uc) since uc is negative 
in some quarters for some areas. As in Grimes and Aitken (2004) we proxy real capital gains 
expectations within the uc term as the last three years' annual rate of capital gain within the area. 13 
these variables to be identical across areas reflecting shared underlying 
preferences. Area fixed effects are included; time fixed effects are replaced by 
inclusion of an area-specific time trend for each TLA to account for long run 
(deterministic) trends in tastes towards different regions (e.g. towards climate or 
coastal proximity).  The resulting equation, estimated using pooled least squares,
15 
is presented as (7): 
 
ln{PHit/PCt} = 0.4514lnXPRODit + 0.9484lnXEMPit - 2.9811lnDD it - 0.0138UCit  
(7)    
                        (0.0710)                    (0.1780)                (0.2616)            (0.0007) 
                        [0.0000]                    [0.0000]                [0.0000]            [0.0000] 
 
Adj.R
2 = 0.972;  s.e. = 0.0738;  n=3,942  (1991q1-2004q2)   
Constant, area FEs and area-specific time trends included but not reported; White 
period standard errors in round brackets; p-values in square brackets; mean of 
dependent variable = 4.6355 (std dev = 0.4416). 
 
 
For the purposes of our study, it is the dynamic response of house prices to a 
demand shock - i.e. to the explanatory variables in (7) - that is of major interest. 
We estimate an adjustment equation, standard in the cointegration approach
16 and 
consistent with (6), as in (8): 
 
∆ln{PHit/PCt} = η0 + ηi1[ln{PHit-1/PCt-1}* - ln{PHit-1/PCt-1}] + η2Sit-2 + ζit  (8)   
 
where ζit is an iid error term, and Sit-2 is the ratio of house sales to 
housing stock in region i in period t-2. We include this variable since earlier 
research (Grimes and Aitken, 2004) indicates that prior sales strongly influence 
                                                             
15 PLS is used since all variables are non-stationary (Grimes and Aitken, 2004), making PLS 
estimates super-consistent. The residual from (7) is stationary: the null of a unit root is rejected at 
p=0.0000 for each of the Levin, Lin and Chu t-test, the Breitung t-test, the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-statistic, the ADF-Fisher Chi-square statistic, and the PP-Fisher Chi-square statistic; the null of 
no unit root is not rejected by the Hadri Z-statistic (p=0.9385). Equation (7) therefore represents a 
cointegrating vector.  
16 Engle and Granger (1987). We have reversed the order of the variables within the adjustment 
term compared with the more usual cointegration adjustment specification to aid interpretation 
without any change to methodology. 14 
price dynamics. The coefficient, ηi1, is the responsiveness of house prices in 
period t to a demand shock in period t-1 in region i. Initially we estimate (8) with 
ηi1 restricted to be identical across regions and then estimate the panel with ηi1 
unrestricted.
17  Subsequently, we test whether the unrestricted estimates of ηi1 are 
related systematically to estimated supply responsiveness in each area. Results of 
estimating (8), with ηi1 restricted, using PLS
18 are shown as (9): 
 
∆ln{PHit/PCt} = -0.0170 + 0.5816[ln{PHit-1/PCt-1}* -ln{PHit-1/PCt-1}] + 1.6807Sit-2     
(9)   
                           (0.0034)   (0.0309)                                                          (0.2202) 
                           [0.0000]   [0.0000]                                                          [0.0000] 
 
Adj.R
2 = 0.287;  s.e. = 0.0671;  n=3,869  (1991q2-2004q2)  
White period standard errors in round brackets; p-values in square brackets. 
    
When re-estimated with ηi1 unrestricted, the estimates of ηi1 vary across 
regions with a mean of 0.50 and standard deviation of 0.22. The standard 
deviation indicates that substantial variation in adjustment dynamics across 
regions is apparent. Figure 3 presents a scatter plot of the estimated price 
adjustment parameters (ηi1) against the estimated (IV) supply adjustment 
parameters (γi1). While the match is far from perfect, a negative relationship 
between the two, as predicted by theory, is apparent.  
The significance of this relationship is explored further in Table 3. We 
hypothesise that ηi1 will be smaller the larger is the estimate of γi1. Columns 1 and 
2 report a cross-section regression of ηi1 on a constant plus the PLS and IV 
estimates of γi1 respectively. In each case, the coefficient on γi1 is negative and 
                                                             
17 The equation does not include area fixed effects; when added, they are jointly insignificant and 
other coefficients remain virtually unchanged.  
18 PLS is appropriate since all explanatory variables are lagged. There is little evidence of 
autocorrelation (DW=2.08) but since the Durbin-Watson statistic is not appropriate in the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable, we report (robust) White period standard errors. Equation 
estimates are unweighted; estimates are virtually unchanged using GLS with period weights; when 
cross-section weights are used the estimate of η1 and η2 fall a little to 0.4710 and 1.5027 
respectively. Population-weighted estimates are similar, as are estimates weighted by housing 
stock and also by house sales. 15 
significant at the 1% level.
19 This result is consistent with local authorities having 
low supply elasticities tending to have high price responses to demand shocks. 
Since land prices (which, inter alia, reflect geographical conditions) are already 
included in the supply equation, the difference in supply elasticity is most likely 
related to regulatory differences across local authorities. 
The supply equation includes area fixed effects. It is possible that areas 
which have strong supply growth, irrespective of price elasticity of supply, may 
have different price dynamics compared with regions with slower supply growth. 
Our supply equations also include the effects of land prices. We hypothesise that 
areas with high land price growth may be subject to planning regulations that 
inhibit new residential land development.
20 If there is such an effect, we expect 
areas with high residential land price growth (possibly reflecting greater 
regulatory constraints) to exhibit stronger price dynamics and hence a larger ηi1.  
We extend the equations in Table 2 to take account of these additional 
factors. Column 3 adds the area fixed effects from the (PLS) supply equation and 
also adds the rate of increase of residential land prices for each area over the 
sample period. Column 4 presents the corresponding results based on the IV 
supply equation. The coefficient on γi1 stays negative and significant at the 5% 
level in each equation. The coefficient on residential land price increases is 
positive (as expected if regulatory constraints that affect land are present); they 
are significant at the 10% level using the PLS-based estimates and at 12% using 
the IV-based estimates. The area FEs are not significantly different from zero in 
either equation (p= 0.89 and 0.77 respectively) indicating that price dynamics are 
not related to the underlying housing supply growth within an area. 
Columns 5 and 6 drop the area fixed effects from the equation. The 
resulting estimates of the effects of γi1 and of land price increases are little 
                                                             
19 We note that the regressor (γi1) is stochastic and so its p-value in this and subsequent regressions 
may be under-stated. The ηi1 and γi1 estimates are, however, obtained within a systems context 
since the (lagged) determinants of house prices are included as the instruments in the supply 
equation, so reducing the  potential for the error term within γi1 to be correlated with that for ηi1. 
Accordingly, the strong significance of γi1 shown across all the equations in Table 3 indicates that 
the estimated negative relationship between the two parameters is likely to be robust. 
20 Such regulations may well be positively correlated with regulations inhibiting new construction 
(given the land supply). 16 
changed, although the former are now significant at 1% in each case. The results 
indicate that local authorities with low supply elasticities and (more tentatively) 
high land price increases face more volatile price adjustment in response to 
demand shocks, possibly due to regulatory constraints.  
The analysis above is primarily concerned with determining the process 
of dynamic supply and price adjustments to shocks. We note here that the data 
also indicate a (tentative) relationship between long run supply responsiveness 
and long run house price increases. Our previous estimates indicate that in the 
short run, higher house prices (relative to costs) induce higher new house supply; 
thus there is a positive short run relationship between house prices and new 
supply. Over the full sample period, however, there is a negative relationship 
between new supply (summed over the entire period and expressed relative to the 
initial housing stock in each region) and house price increases (relative to local 
land price increases). Despite the short run positive relationship, the cross-
sectional (long run) correlation coefficient between the two is -0.17 (significant at 
the 15% level).  
This long run result is consistent with the nature of long run price shifts 
indicated by Figure 2, in which a flatter (more responsive) supply schedule 
reduces the long run price increase consequent on an increase in demand (i.e. 
reduces the gap between PL and P0). While not the main focus of the paper, this 
consistency of long run outcomes with short run dynamics, in line with theoretical 
priors, is a useful robustness check on the dynamic findings which are the major 




Housing supply and house price dynamics are inextricably inter-related. 
We find that an increase in house prices (relative to total development costs) 
raises new house supply with an elasticity of between 0.5% and 1.1%, the upper 
estimate corresponding to our (preferred) instrumental variables estimate. Unlike 
most previous studies, we incorporate land prices as well as construction costs in 
our measure of total development costs; and unlike the few studies that have 
incorporated land prices, we find both land and construction costs to have a 
statistically significant effect on new house construction. One reason that may 
explain why we find land prices to be significant while others studies do not (apart 
from the different country setting) is that we use residential land values rather than 
values of surrounding agricultural land. The latter may not be the appropriate land 
price measure in circumstances where zoning restrictions provide the binding 
constraint as to whether land is used for residential or agricultural purposes. 
We find that the estimated supply responsiveness coefficient is 
inversely related to the estimated coefficient determining price dynamics. Prices 
react more strongly to a demand change in local authorities in which housing 
supply responsiveness is low compared with those in which supply responsiveness 
is high. A 1% increase in equilibrium prices (calculated on the basis of the 
existing housing stock) leads to an immediate 0.56% jump in house prices in an 
authority with lower quartile supply responsiveness, compared with a 0.45% jump 
in an authority with upper quartile supply responsiveness.  
Since responsiveness is faster in the latter case, the length of time that 
prices are raised above their long run equilibrium is also shorter in the more 
responsive than the less responsive authority. Thus the impact on resource 
(mis)allocation is more pronounced in the less responsive authority and lasts for 
longer than if it were more responsive. 
Without specific regulatory data, we cannot attribute the differences in 
supply responsiveness to regulatory versus other factors. However our results for 18 
the local authorities within Auckland are consistent with the case study findings of 
McShane (1996) for the same city. In addition, the fact that we have controlled for 
land prices in calculating these estimates implies that geographical factors are 
most likely not the 'culprit' in determining supply responsiveness. 
Land prices themselves have a strong impact on new house 
construction. A 1% increase in land prices is estimated to lift total development 
costs by 0.33% (using the restricted IV estimate), in turn reducing house supply 
by an estimated 0.37%. Thus regulations, such as zoning restrictions, that impact 
on the availability of residential land (forcing up residential land prices) induce 
lower house supply and raise house prices in affected authorities. 
These results are consistent with, and extend, the findings of recent 
studies in the United States on links between housing supply and house price 
dynamics. The key contribution of this paper - apart from extending the evidence 
base to another country - is to highlight explicitly the role of residential land 
prices in determining supply responses and thence price dynamics. Similar use of 
residential, rather than agricultural, land prices may warrant investigation in 
countries, such as the United States, in which land prices have hitherto not 
featured prominently in estimated house supply relationships. 19 
Appendix A: Data 
We use a quarterly dataset of median house prices for New Zealand for 
the period 1991q1-2004q2 covering 73 Territorial Local Authorities (TLA). 
House price data are sourced from Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ), a state-
owned organisation. The data include median sales prices, median capital values 
(i.e. official valuations used for property tax purposes) and the number of 
residential property sales at TLA level. QVNZ provides data for residential 
dwellings covering several categories. In this analysis we use residential dwellings 
defined as those dwellings of a fully detached or semi-detached style on their own 
clearly defined piece of land. We use median rather than mean data as this is less 
susceptible to being distorted by extremely low or high observations.  
We mix-adjust the median data for each TLA, recognising that the types 
of property sold vary from year to year within a TLA. Our mix-adjustment 
procedure builds on the valuation-based approach of Bourassa et al (2004). We 
hypothesise that the observed house sales price, SPzt, comprises three 
components: a (flexible) trend component (SPFzt), a component due to the mix of 
houses sold in each year MIXzt, and a random element, χzt, that is orthogonal to 
MIXzt. We assume that SPzt is proportional to SPFzt; thus we maintain that the 
following relationship exists explaining the observed SPzt data: 
 
ln(SPzt) = ln(SPFzt) + c0z + c1zln(MIXzt) + χzt   (10) 
 
Our MIXzt variable is obtained by taking the ratio of the median capital value for 
houses sold each year to the trend (HP filtered) median capital value of houses 
sold, where the latter is a proxy for the capital value of the "typical" house within 
a TLA. Our SPFzt variable is formed as the HP filtered median sales price. We 
estimate (14) for each TLA and then derive the mix adjusted price (Pzt):
21 
                                                             
21 The standard deviation of the mix-adjusted sales price is lower than for the raw median sales 
price for every TLA. The smoothing is greater for TLAs with more volatile data; volatility, in turn, 
is related inversely to the number of TLA sales. Together, these results indicate that the adjustment 
is indeed compensating for mix differences within TLAs across years. 20 
 
       Pzt = exp[ln(SPzt) - c1zln(MIXzt)] ≡ exp[ln(SPFzt)+ c0z + χzt]   (11) 
 
We obtain land prices relating to residential properties from QVNZ. 
QVNZ valuations (which are generally conducted on a three yearly cycle) split 
residential property values into structures and land components. We use these data 
to construct a flexible trend representing TLA land values over the full period. 
The number of TLA residential sales per quarter is also sourced from 
QVNZ. These data are used to form S, the ratio of house sales to the housing 
stock in each region. Data on the housing stock in each TLA are available from 
the 1991, 1996 and 2001 censuses. They are interpolated to form quarterly 
observations. 
Housing consents are available on a quarterly basis from Statistics New 
Zealand. These data include residential houses with a value greater than $4,999.
22 
The data are seasonally adjusted using X-12 Arima.   
Construction cost data are sourced from the trade publication, New 
Zealand Building Economist, and are available on a quarterly basis from 1992 to 
2004 for six regions covering the entire country. We use the cost for standard 
dwellings
23 which represents average installed prices. The cost includes trade 
materials prices, labour rates, plus allowance (according to local conditions) for 
overheads, subcontractors, and subcontractors’ profit where applicable.  
                                                             
22 Includes houses not attached to others, unit/flat/townhouse/studio attached and unattached 
horizontally, apartment blocks attached vertically, granny flat unattached, dwellings added to other 
buildings, communal accommodation and other residential dwellings not elsewhere included. 
23 Standard house specification: 2001 onwards: 94m2; 3 bedroom; level site; timber pile base; fibre 
cement base lining with plastic vents; timber steps; fibre cement weatherboards; R 2.2 batts to 
walls, R 2.4 batts to ceilings; truss gable roof with ceiling battens; Zincalume roofing and 
accessories; aluminium joinery; particle board floor; Gib board to walls and ceilings; shower over 
bath; separate wc; separate laundry with ss tub and cupboard under; 12 lights; 16 power outlets; 
average quality wallpaper; conventional four element stove. 1992 - 2000: 94m2; 3 bedroom; level 
site; concrete pile basement/fibre cement lined; concrete steps; weatherboards; all exterior walls 
and ceilings lined with 75mm batts; corrugated iron gable roof; timber joinery; particle board 
floor; gibraltar board walls; sloping ceiling with exposed rafters to dining room/lounge; flat ceiling 
to other areas; separate shower/bath/laundry; separate WC; 12 lights; 16 power points; average 
quality wallpapers; conventional four ring stove. 21 
Per capita TLA production, XPROD, is formed by weighting quarterly 
GDP by industry
24 (one-digit ANZSIC
25) by industry employment data from the 
1991, 1996 and 2001 censuses.
26 This variable is therefore akin to a Bartik index 
(Bartik, 1991). While data unavailability necessitates the use of national industry 
production data (albeit weighted by TLA-specific weights), an advantage is that 
we thereby mitigate any endogeneity issues which could arise from use of TLA-
specific production data (if such data were available). 
Data for labour force participation (XEMP: ratio employed over total 
usually resident population aged over 15) was obtained from the 1986, 1991, 1996 
and 2001 censuses and linearly interpolated to form quarterly observations. 
UC, the real user cost of capital, was formulated exactly as in Grimes et 
al (2004). It comprises the real 90-day bank bill rate (i.e. the nominal rate less 
annual CPI inflation) minus the expected rate of real capital gain on housing 
within a TLA. The past three years' annual rate of real capital gain on houses at 
the TLA level is used as the measure of expected real capital gains.
27 The 
quarterly consumers price index is sourced from the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. 
                                                             
24 The GDP data (constant prices) was seasonally adjusted using X-12 ARIMA.  
25 Australian New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification. There are 18 industry groups in the 
one-digit classification: Agriculture, forestry and fish (AGR), Mining (MIN), Manufacturing 
(MAN), Electricity, gas and water (EGW), Construction (CON), Wholesale trade (WHO), Retail 
trade (RET), Accommodation, cafes and restaurants (ACR), Transport and storage (TRN), 
Communication services (COM), Finance and insurance (FIN), Property and business services 
(PRP), Government administration and defence (GOV), Education (EDN), Health and community 
services (HEA), Cultural and recreational services (CUL), Personal and other services (PER) and 
Industry not specified (NSP). 
26 The Census employment data has been linearly interpolated to quarterly observations. 
27 Grimes et al (2004) tested a variety of expected real capital gains proxies, finding that 
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βi (Implied)   0.1795 0.3465 0.3094 0.2780 
Adj.R
2  0.778 0.833 0.727 0.822 
s.e.  0.0015 0.0013 0.0017 0.0014 
n  3,869 3,869 3,869 3,869 
 
Notes: 
Estimated equation:   HCit/Hit-1 = λ'0 + γi1ln{PHit/PBit} + µiln{PBit/PLit} + λ'iFEi + λ'tFEt  + εit  
where implied βi=µi/γi1 (calculated at means of µi and γi1 for unrestricted estimates).  
White period standard errors in round brackets; p-values in square brackets. 
PLS is pooled (ordinary) least squares estimation; IV is instrumental variables estimation. 
All equations estimated over 1991q2 - 2004q2. 
Mean (standard deviation) of dependent variable = 0.0038 (0.0032).  
Constant, region fixed effects and time fixed effects included but not reported.  
Adj.R
2 is the adjusted R
2; s.e. is the equation standard error.  
n is number of observations (all equations cover 73 regions for 53 quarters). 
Individual coefficients not reported in unrestricted equations (means of coefficients are reported); 
p-values in unrestricted equations refer to F-test for significance of all 73 regional coefficients. 
IV instruments: lnXPRODit-1, lnXEMPit-1, lnDDit-1, UCit-1, Sit-2, TIMEt, constant); see section 3 and 




Table 2: Auckland Core TLA Supply Parameter Estimates 
TLA Supply  Responsiveness 
(γi1) 
Region Fixed Effect 
(λ'i) 
North Shore  0.63% -0.16% 
Waitakere  0.73% 0.78% 
Auckland City  1.05% 0.81% 
Manukau  1.56% 1.37% 
Papakura  1.58% 1.91% 
 
Notes: 
Parameters are instrumental variables estimates consistent with Table 1, corresponding to equation 
(4); thus a 1% rise in house prices relative to costs increases quarterly housing consents relative to 
the housing stock by 0.63% in North Shore. 
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2  0.140 0.114 0.151 0.122 0.163 0.134 
s.e.  0.203 0.206 0.202 0.206 0.201 0.204 
n  73 73 73 73 73 73 
 
Notes: 
Estimated equation:  ηi1 = c0 + c1* γi1 +c2*AFEi + c3*Land-Inci  + ξi  
where ηi1 is the estimated price adjustment parameter from (9); γi1 is the estimated supply elasticity 
from the PLS and IV supply equation respectively (corresponding to the equation heading); AFEi 
are the area fixed effects from the PLS and IV supply equations; Land-Inci is the rate of residential 
land price increase over the sample period; ξi is an iid error term;  
c0, c1, c2 and c3 are estimated coefficients from a cross-section regression. 
Standard errors in round brackets; p-values in square brackets. 
 
 27 
























-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8












































































































































Motu Working Paper Series 
05–14. Jason Timmins, “Is infrastructure productive? Evaluating the effects of specific 
infrastructure projects on firm productivity within New Zealand” 
05–13. Andrew Coleman, Sylvia Dixon, and David C Maré, “Māori economic development – 
Glimpses from statistical sources” 
05–12. Maré, David C, “Concentration, Specialisation and Agglomeration of firms in New 
Zealand” 
05–11. Holmes, Mark J and Arthur Grimes, “Is there long-run convergence of regional house 
prices in the UK?” 
05–10. Hendy, Joanna and Suzi Kerr, “Greenhouse Gas Emission Factor Module: Land Use in 
Rural New Zealand–Climate Version 1”. 
05–09. Poland, Michelle and David C Maré, “Defining Geographic Communities”. 
05–08. Kerr, Suzi, Joanna Hendy, Emma Brunton and Isabelle Sin, “The likely regional impacts of 
an agricultural emissions policy in New Zealand: Preliminary analysis”. 
05–07. Stillman, Steven, “Examining Changes in the Value of Rural Land in New  Zealand 
between 1989 and 2003”. 
05–06. Dixon, Sylvia and David C. Maré, “Changes in the Māori Income Distribution: Evidence 
from the Population Census”. 
05–05. Sin, Isabelle and Steven Stillman, “The Geographical Mobility of Māori in New Zealand”. 
05–04. Grimes, Arthur, “Regional and Industry Cycles in Australasia: Implications for a Common 
Currency”. 
05–03. Grimes, Arthur, “Intra and Inter-Regional Industry Shocks: A New Metric with an 
Application to Australasian Currency Union”.  
05–02. Grimes, Arthur, Robert Sourell and Andrew Aitken, “Regional Variation in Rental Costs 
for Larger Households”.  
05–01. Maré, David C., “Indirect Effects of Active Labour Market Policies”.  
04–12. Dixon, Sylvia and David C Maré, “Understanding Changes in Maori Incomes and Income 
Inequality 1997–2003”. 
04–11. Grimes, Arthur, “New Zealand: A Typical Australasian Economy?” 
04–10. Hall, Viv and C. John McDermott, “Regional business cycles in New Zealand: Do they 
exist? What might drive them?” 
04–09. Grimes, Arthur, Suzi Kerr and Andrew Aitken, “Bi-Directional Impacts of Economic, 
Social and Environmental changes and the New Zealand Housing Market”. 
04–08. Grimes, Arthur, Andrew Aitken, “What’s the Beef with House Prices? Economic Shocks 
and Local Housing Markets”. 
04–07. McMillan, John, “Quantifying Creative Destruction: Entrepreneurship and Productivity in 
New Zealand”. 
04–06. Maré, David C and Isabelle Sin, “Maori Incomes: Investigating Differences Between Iwi” 
04–05. Kerr, Suzi, Emma Brunton and Ralph Chapman, “Policy to Encourage Carbon 
Sequestration in Plantation Forests”. 
04–04. Maré, David C, “What do Endogenous Growth Models Contribute?” 
04–03. Kerr, Suzi, Joanna Hendy, Shuguang Liu and Alexander S.P. Pfaff, “Uncertainty and 
Carbon Policy Integrity”. 
04–02. Grimes, Arthur, Andrew Aitken and Suzi Kerr, “House Price Efficiency: Expectations, 
Sales, Symmetry”. 31 
04–01. Kerr, Suzi; Andrew Aitken and Arthur Grimes, “Land Taxes and Revenue Needs as 
Communities Grow and Decline: Evidence from New Zealand”. 
03–19. Maré, David C, “Ideas for Growth?”. 
03–18. Fabling, Richard and Arthur Grimes, “Insolvency and Economic Development:Regional 
Variation and Adjustment”. 
03–17. Kerr, Suzi; Susana Cardenas and Joanna Hendy, “Migration and the Environment in the 
Galapagos: An analysis of economic and policy incentives driving migration, potential 
impacts from migration control, and potential policies to reduce migration pressure”. 
03–16. Hyslop, Dean R. and David C. Maré, “Understanding New Zealand’s Changing Income 
Distribution 1983–98: A Semiparametric Analysis”. 
03–15. Kerr, Suzi, “Indigenous Forests and Forest Sink Policy in New Zealand”. 
03–14. Hall, Viv and Angela Huang, “Would Adopting the US Dollar Have Led To Improved 
Inflation, Output and Trade Balances for New Zealand in the 1990s?” 
03–13. Ballantyne, Suzie; Simon Chapple, David C. Maré and Jason Timmins, “Movement into 
and out of Child Poverty in New Zealand: Results from the Linked Income Supplement”. 
03–12. Kerr, Suzi, “Efficient Contracts for Carbon Credits from Reforestation Projects”. 
03–11. Lattimore, Ralph, “Long Run Trends in New Zealand Industry Assistance”. 
03–10. Grimes, Arthur, “Economic Growth and the Size & Structure of Government: Implications 
for New Zealand”.  
03–09. Grimes, Arthur; Suzi Kerr and Andrew Aitken, “Housing and Economic Adjustment”. 
03–07. Maré, David C. and Jason Timmins, “Moving to Jobs”. 
03–06. Kerr, Suzi; Shuguang Liu, Alexander S. P. Pfaff and R. Flint Hughes, “Carbon Dynamics 
and Land-Use Choices: Building a Regional-Scale Multidisciplinary Model”. 
03–05. Kerr, Suzi, “Motu, Excellence in Economic Research and the Challenges of 'Human 
Dimensions' Research”. 
03–04. Kerr, Suzi and Catherine Leining, “Joint Implementation in Climate Change Policy”. 
03–03. Gibson, John, “Do Lower Expected Wage Benefits Explain Ethnic Gaps in Job-Related 
Training? Evidence from New Zealand”. 
03–02. Kerr, Suzi; Richard G. Newell and James N. Sanchirico, “Evaluating the New Zealand 
Individual Transferable Quota Market for Fisheries Management”. 
03–01. Kerr, Suzi, “Allocating Risks in a Domestic Greenhouse Gas Trading System”. 
All papers are available online at http://www.motu.org.nz/motu_wp_series.htm 
 